ID card fallout of child benefit fiasco
The Child Benefit data loss is all over the front pages this morning, and some of the articles also explicitly refer to the implications for the ID card scheme.
Philip Johnston writes in the Daily Telegraph:
MPs have questioned how the Government could be entrusted with the details of every adult in the land when it is so cavalier with personal data.
Alistair Darling said that the biometric identifiers that would be entered on to the ID database would make such blunders less likely.
But it does not matter how secure the technology is. It is only as effective as the people who look after the information.
There are stiff penalties in the ID Card Act for anyone misusing the data.
However, if procedures are not followed or if criminals corruptly obtain the details we will all be compromised.
This was always going to be the biggest problem with ID cards.
Alan Travis reports on Home Office reaction in the Guardian:
The Home Office last night sought to shore up public trust in its £5.6bn identity card project, as the failure over child benefit records fed into anxieties over so-called “Big Brother” databases.
Critics of the “surveillance society” claimed the ID cards project could not now go ahead without a review of its privacy safeguards to see if they worked. They also raised concern about leaks from other databases, including NHS personal records and the new children’s register.
The Home Office insisted that the biometric elements in its database, the electronic fingerprints and facial scans, will keep it secure and proof against identity theft, even if there were to be a major breach and stolen confidential data.
Even the Sun has a one-line comment in its coverage:
The shocking blunder means Labour’s plan to bring in ID cards now looks doomed.
November 21st, 2007 at 10:40
The problem with the National ID card as seems to be defined in the Dec 06 report by Sir David Varney is that it relies on a single database holding all records. Perhaps this week’s compromise of child benefit records is a fortunate occurence as it has caused the strategy for the ID card to be questioned.
An individual’s ID already exists in digital form, however today it is distributed between government departments, commercial organizations such as banks, insurance companies, retailers, healthcare providers etc.
If this data becomes joined up (as is already happening as a result of cross-marketing deals between commercial organizations) possibly greater risks of data compromise are created.
There is a way of federating all existing data that exists about an individual that I have documented here http://www.realtea.net/personal_data_mgt