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	<title>Comments on: Unrecognised iris</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.no2id.net/newsblog/2007-04/unrecognised-iris/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.no2id.net/newsblog/2007-04/unrecognised-iris/</link>
	<description>The latest on Identity Cards and Databases in the UK</description>
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		<title>By: mystork</title>
		<link>http://www.no2id.net/newsblog/2007-04/unrecognised-iris/comment-page-1/#comment-135566</link>
		<dc:creator>mystork</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Jan 2008 08:39:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.no2id.net/news/newsblog/?p=571#comment-135566</guid>
		<description>good! iam glad to see you![url=http://cheap-wow-gold.net.cn]wow gold[/url],the new years,the new hope!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>good! iam glad to see you![url=http://cheap-wow-gold.net.cn]wow gold[/url],the new years,the new hope!</p>
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		<title>By: David Moss</title>
		<link>http://www.no2id.net/newsblog/2007-04/unrecognised-iris/comment-page-1/#comment-66119</link>
		<dc:creator>David Moss</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Apr 2007 15:15:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.no2id.net/news/newsblog/?p=571#comment-66119</guid>
		<description>Old techies will share with me a warm glow of recognition. Symantec PC Anywhere. &lt;i&gt;(Sigh)&lt;/i&gt; Even older ones will remember Norton PC Anywhere (or was it Anyware?). Five-and-a-quarter-inch diskettes. 300 bits-per-second Hayes Smartmodems.

Of course, that was &lt;i&gt;last&lt;/i&gt; millennium. Not this one. Not the &lt;i&gt;21st&lt;/i&gt; century and &lt;i&gt;new&lt;/i&gt; Labour&#039;s innovative vision of joined up broadband government. Wasn&#039;t it?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Old techies will share with me a warm glow of recognition. Symantec PC Anywhere. <i>(Sigh)</i> Even older ones will remember Norton PC Anywhere (or was it Anyware?). Five-and-a-quarter-inch diskettes. 300 bits-per-second Hayes Smartmodems.</p>
<p>Of course, that was <i>last</i> millennium. Not this one. Not the <i>21st</i> century and <i>new</i> Labour&#8217;s innovative vision of joined up broadband government. Wasn&#8217;t it?</p>
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		<title>By: Nigel Sedgwick</title>
		<link>http://www.no2id.net/newsblog/2007-04/unrecognised-iris/comment-page-1/#comment-66101</link>
		<dc:creator>Nigel Sedgwick</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Apr 2007 08:12:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.no2id.net/news/newsblog/?p=571#comment-66101</guid>
		<description>As posted &lt;a href=&quot;http://forum.no2id.net/viewtopic.php?p=59882#59882&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;here on NO2ID&lt;/a&gt;, there are aspects of the system architecture chosen by the Government for their Project Iris that (intentionally or carelessly) give up accuracy in biometric identification for something else (a few seconds of passenger time or &quot;border crossing channel time&quot;), that the Government presumably views as more valuable.

Now, as a passenger, I&#039;m delighted if the Government values my time: I&#039;d like to see more of it too.  However, the lack of supporting evidence elsewhere keeps me sceptical.

It is an interesting question as to whether biometrics can be made worthwhile overall (sufficiently accurate and sufficiently cost-effective) at this time for unsupervised identity checks at borders (even if just of registered frequent travellers).  However, actively choosing to slug identification performance in this way (use of one-to-many matching) is surely not the way to go about it.

The issue is, perhaps, one of enamourment with technology, rather than rational engagement: so nothing new there then!

Best regards</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As posted <a href="http://forum.no2id.net/viewtopic.php?p=59882#59882" rel="nofollow">here on NO2ID</a>, there are aspects of the system architecture chosen by the Government for their Project Iris that (intentionally or carelessly) give up accuracy in biometric identification for something else (a few seconds of passenger time or &#8220;border crossing channel time&#8221;), that the Government presumably views as more valuable.</p>
<p>Now, as a passenger, I&#8217;m delighted if the Government values my time: I&#8217;d like to see more of it too.  However, the lack of supporting evidence elsewhere keeps me sceptical.</p>
<p>It is an interesting question as to whether biometrics can be made worthwhile overall (sufficiently accurate and sufficiently cost-effective) at this time for unsupervised identity checks at borders (even if just of registered frequent travellers).  However, actively choosing to slug identification performance in this way (use of one-to-many matching) is surely not the way to go about it.</p>
<p>The issue is, perhaps, one of enamourment with technology, rather than rational engagement: so nothing new there then!</p>
<p>Best regards</p>
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		<title>By: The latest on Identity Cards and Databases in the UK &#171; plausible futures</title>
		<link>http://www.no2id.net/newsblog/2007-04/unrecognised-iris/comment-page-1/#comment-66002</link>
		<dc:creator>The latest on Identity Cards and Databases in the UK &#171; plausible futures</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Apr 2007 18:27:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.no2id.net/news/newsblog/?p=571#comment-66002</guid>
		<description>[...] boot the whole thing now.” British government electronic technology triumphs again. From No2ID.net 	 					 				 					 						This entry was posted on 						Tuesday, April 17th, 2007 at 6:23 pm	 [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] boot the whole thing now.” British government electronic technology triumphs again. From No2ID.net 	 					 				 					 						This entry was posted on 						Tuesday, April 17th, 2007 at 6:23 pm	 [...]</p>
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		<title>By: David Moss</title>
		<link>http://www.no2id.net/newsblog/2007-04/unrecognised-iris/comment-page-1/#comment-65691</link>
		<dc:creator>David Moss</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Apr 2007 11:23:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.no2id.net/news/newsblog/?p=571#comment-65691</guid>
		<description>That&#039;s a beaut, Andrew.

I have added it to my &lt;a href=&quot;http://dematerialisedid.com/Evidence/Biometrics.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;collection of biometrics stories&lt;/a&gt;.

This collection is available to anyone requiring evidence of the (un)reliability of the biometrics the Home Office have chosen for ePassports and ID cards.

Too often, the Home Office give the impression that these biometrics are nearly 100% reliable. They aren&#039;t.

Too often, campaigners sell the pass by acceding in that impression. The fear isn&#039;t that we can all be authoritatively identified by our biometrics. To campaign on that basis is to grant the Home Office&#039;s 100% claim.

The real outrage is that these biometrics don&#039;t identify us reliably. The money spent on them is wasted.

These matters are discussed at some length in &lt;a href=&quot;http://DematerialisedID.com/Biometrics.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;dematerialised ID&lt;/a&gt;, which I commend to you. (The material in that link is copyrighted and I would ask anyone who uses it to give a citation.)

Biometrics are not a minor bolt-on to the ID cards schemes proposed for the UK and other countries. They are an essential component and a critique of biometrics is therefore an important part of the general campaign against ID cards.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>That&#8217;s a beaut, Andrew.</p>
<p>I have added it to my <a href="http://dematerialisedid.com/Evidence/Biometrics.html" rel="nofollow">collection of biometrics stories</a>.</p>
<p>This collection is available to anyone requiring evidence of the (un)reliability of the biometrics the Home Office have chosen for ePassports and ID cards.</p>
<p>Too often, the Home Office give the impression that these biometrics are nearly 100% reliable. They aren&#8217;t.</p>
<p>Too often, campaigners sell the pass by acceding in that impression. The fear isn&#8217;t that we can all be authoritatively identified by our biometrics. To campaign on that basis is to grant the Home Office&#8217;s 100% claim.</p>
<p>The real outrage is that these biometrics don&#8217;t identify us reliably. The money spent on them is wasted.</p>
<p>These matters are discussed at some length in <a href="http://DematerialisedID.com/Biometrics.html" rel="nofollow">dematerialised ID</a>, which I commend to you. (The material in that link is copyrighted and I would ask anyone who uses it to give a citation.)</p>
<p>Biometrics are not a minor bolt-on to the ID cards schemes proposed for the UK and other countries. They are an essential component and a critique of biometrics is therefore an important part of the general campaign against ID cards.</p>
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