ID Cards and the National Identity Register: The Bill a Summary
Many people believe that the government’s ID scheme is just a “simple
piece of plastic”. This could not be further from the truth. The government
is planning to establish a vast, complex and far-reaching system that will involve
an unprecedented use of personal information.
- The Bill outlines an identity system that has eight components
- The National Identification Register. Clause 1 of the Bill imposes
an obligation on the Secretary of State to establish a central population
register containing a wide range of details of every UK citizen and resident
aged 16 and above.
- The code. Clause 2 (6) requires that every individual must be given
a unique number.
- Biometrics. Clause 5 (5) requires individuals to submit to fingerprinting
and “other” means of physical identification. This is likely
to include electronic face scanning and iris recognition.
- The card. Clause 8 establishes the actual identity card, generated
from and containing the information in the Register.
- Legal obligations. Clause 15 establishes a requirement to produce the
card in order to obtain public services.
- Administrative convergence. The number and the card register are used
by a variety of agencies and organisations as their administrative basis.
1 (5) permits the bringing together of all registration numbers (National
Insurance, NHS etc) used by a person.
- Cross notification. Agencies will be required to notify each other
of changes to a person's details. Clause 19 authorises the Secretary of
State to disclose details from the register to other agencies without
the consent of the individual.
- New crimes and penalties. The Bill establishes a large number of new
crimes and offences to ensure that people comply with the ID requirements.
- Will an identity card help eliminate benefit fraud?
The government has not provided evidence to support such a claim. David Blunkett
went so far as to dismiss the significance of identity fraud in welfare, saying
"benefit fraud is only a tiny part of the problem in the benefit system".
The majority of fraud on the benefits system is through under-reporting of
income, or non-reporting of financial and family circumstances. Benefits agencies
worldwide agree that false identity is not a key issue. The cost to government
of establishing an ID infrastructure for benefits would amount to many times
the annual loss through false identity.
- Will an identity card help prevent terrorism?
The government has no idea. On July 3rd, in response to a question by Chris
Mullin MP, David Blunkett said, “I accept that it is important that
we do not pretend that an entitlement card would be an overwhelming factor
in combating international terrorism”. The published evidence refutes
all these claims. In 2004 Privacy International published the findings of
the only research ever conducted on the relationship between identity cards
and terrorism. It found that there was no evidence to support the claim that
identity cards can combat terrorist threats. The report stated: “The
presence of an identity card is not recognised by analysts as a meaningful
or significant component in anti-terrorism strategies. Almost two thirds of
known terrorists operate under their true identity. The remainder use a variety
of techniques to forge or impersonate identities. It is possible that the
existence of a high integrity identity card would provide a measure of improved
legitimacy for these people.”
- Will the Identity system reduce the problem of Identity theft?
There is a substantial body of evidence to show that the establishment of
centralised identity can increase the incidence of identity theft. The clearest
example of this relationship exists in the United States, where the Social
Security Number has become an identity hub and a central reference point to
index and link identity. Obtaining a person’s SSN provides a single
interface with that person’s dealings with a vast number of private
and public bodies. Hence the level of identity theft in the US is extremely
high. This situation applies equally in Australia, where the introduction
of a Tax File Number has also increased the incidence of identity theft beyond
the levels experienced in the UK. The key factor behind identity theft is
the widespread availability of a central number, linked to a range of personal
information.
- Will the Identity system reduce illegal immigration and illegal
working?
Even if all legal UK residents were to have ID cards, non-residents would
still be able to enter the country under a 3-month tourist visa or forged
identity documents of other countries. An ID scheme will create social unrest
as ‘foreign-looking’ people are targeted for ID checks. Illegal
workers are employed by people who do not care about checking their NI number
or other details. They are not going to start caring if there is an ID Card
scheme.
- How much will the scheme cost the taxpayer?
The government estimated in 2002 that the scheme would cost somewhere in the
order of £3.1 billion. When in 2004 the Home Affairs Committee asked
the Home Secretary to clarify the exact amount he refused, citing commercial
secrecy. By the time the final Bill was published in November 2004 the government
acknowledged that the cost of the scheme over ten years would be £5.5
billion. The financial impact on public services and employers, e.g. for secure
scanning equipment and the people to run it, has yet to be calculated.
- Who will pay for this scheme?
We will pay for it out of our own pockets. An “enhanced” passport
(the international requirement for enhancement is just one biometric, a digital
photo of your face, but the Government wants to incorporate at least three
– including your fingerprints and iris scan), which includes an entry
on the national register with no opt-out, will cost around £85. An ID
card without a passport will cost between £35 and £40. There will
be a charge for the renewal or replacement of cards.
- Is the card compulsory or voluntary?
The intention has always been to create a compulsory regime. Government ministers
have almost unanimously ruled out the option for legal compulsion to carry
a card, and indeed clause 15 (3) of the Bill specifically rules out any provision
for requiring people to carry the card at all times. This clause also rules
out compulsion to submit a card to receive a benefit or any public service.
However, this clause does not provide protection to anyone who has been ordered
to register for a card under clause 6 of the Bill. 6 (1) makes clear that
the Secretary of State can order anybody or everybody to register for a card.
This might include benefits recipients, new employees, people wanting to open
a bank account, people of a particular ethnicity, people who have been in
contact with law enforcement or, indeed, the entire population. Clause 2 (4)
of the Bill allows the Secretary of State to enter a person onto the National
Identity Register without that person’s consent. This power will apply,
for example, when a person applies for or renews a passport. Passport holders
will automatically be entered onto the identification register. For those
people who do not have a passport, 6 (1) allows the government to require
you to be registered.
- Presumption of accuracy
As if the dangers of a large National Identity Register were not enough, clause
3(3) intro¬duces a presumption of accuracy in that Register, meaning that
any consequences of inevitable errors in the database will be left with the
individual, who will have no opportu¬nity for redress.
This problem is compounded by the power granted to the Home Secretary by clause
21, which allows the Secretary of State to ‘correct’ information
“where it appears to [him] that the information was inaccurate or incomplete”.
On the surface of it, this might seem a sensible provision, except that there
is no requirement that the Home Secretary verify that what appears to him
is actually the case; it is inevitable, in a database of 75 million individuals,
that this power will introduce greater inaccuracy to the dataset.
- Maintenance of an individual’s record and data sharing
Maintaining one’s record on the National Identity Register is made both
onerous and expensive. Any change in personal circumstances, such as moving
house, requires noti¬fi¬cation to the Home Secretary and a concomitant
fee to be paid. To make matters even worse, should a card be issued with an
error, such as a misspelling of the name, the individual has to pay such a
fee for mistakes made by civil servants!
Clause 19 lists a large number of bodies that may be provided with information
without the subj¬ect’s consent, even before one considers that clauses
20 to 23 allow even wider information sharing. Data may, in the first instance,
be shared with:
- Security Service (MI5);
- Secret Intelligence Service (MI6);
- Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ);
- Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA);
- National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS, until the establishment
of SOCA);
- National Crime Squad (until the establishment of SOCA);
- Any police force (including special constabularies such as the MoD Police
and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary);
- Inland Revenue;
- HM Customs and Excise;
- Any government department (in England, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland);
- Any Designated Documents Authority.
